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Electronic Health Record (EHR) applications are digital versions of paper-based patient's 
health information. They are increasingly adopted to improved quality in healthcare, such as 
convenient access to histories of patient medication and clinic visits, easier follow up of patient 
treatment plans, and precise medical decision-making process. EHR applications are guided 
by measures of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Furthermore, Office of the National Coordinator 
(ONC) for Health Information Technology certification criteria, which focuses on usability 
aspects of EHRs, have overlapping security and privacy requirements. A compliance checking 
approach attempts to identify whether or not an adopted EHR application meets the security 
and privacy criteria. Among others, static code analysis is a common approach to discover 
vulnerabilities in software applications. However, there is no study in the literature to know 
whether traditional static code analysis-based vulnerability discovered can assist in compliance 
checking of regulatory requirements of HIPAA and ONC.  
 
The aim of this thesis is to (i) Identify key security requirements of HIPAA and ONC 
framework; (ii) Evaluate a number of open-source EHR applications for security 
vulnerabilities using open source scanner tools; (iii) Compare and contrast security 
vulnerabilities identified by scanner tools with HIPAA and ONC security requirements; and 
(iv) Propose an approach to secure personal health identifier information within EHR 
applications. 
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Motivation and Problem Statement 
 
1.1 Background 
Digital version of electronic health data improved the quality of healthcare due to easier follow-
ups, lowering cost of patient care, enabling data track over time, and making more precise medical 
decisions. Three types of health records are defined: (i) Electronic Medical Records (EMRs) refer 
to digital version of paper-based clinical data. The clinical data, gathered by clinicians, include 
information that enables the clinicians to make better medical decisions; (ii) Electronic Health 
Records (EHRs) provide a more comprehensive view of the patient’s overall well-being. It 
contains information collected by all clinicians engaged in the patient’s healthcare. Therefore, 
information in EHRs can be shared among all involved providers; and (iii) Personal Health 
Records (PHRs) are EHRs that are controlled and accessed by the patients [1, 2]. 
 
The prevalence of healthcare data security breach can be observed both inside and outside USA. 
According to 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), there were 115 cases of data breach 
in North America during 2015. It included 32% privilege misuse, 22% miscellaneous errors, 19% 
stolen assets, 7% point of sale, 3% cyber-espionage, 3% crimeware, 3% web applications, and 
11% other incidents. Healthcare is among the top industries vulnerable to physical theft and loss, 
miscellaneous errors, insider and privilege misuse, and others. Physical theft and loss is any 
occurrence where information or a device containing information is missing. Miscellaneous errors 
occur when accidental actions weaken a security attribute. Insider threats and privilege misuses 
refer to all unapproved or malicious use [8]. 
 
According to Verizon survey report, some of the reported healthcare data breaches in 2015 were 
as follows: In February, Anthem, a Blue Cross health insurance member-company, reported a data 
breach where 80 million patients were affected. In March, Premera, another Blue Cross member, 
reported a data breach affecting 11 million patients. In both cases, ThreatConnect [9] announced 
that Chinese threat Actor “Deep Panda” was probably the attacker. Partners HealthCare, CareFirst 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, MetroHealth and Bellevue Hospital reported breaches in April of 
8 
 
2015. In June of the same year, US Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reported mega-
breaches for health insurance. The US Department of Health and Human Services reported a 
breach in August 2015 [8]. 
 
In 2017, Emory Healthcare’s appointment system was hacked compromising almost 80,000 
patients Personal Health Information (PHI) data such as names, birthdates, internal medical record 
and appointment information. The appointment information was unencrypted, which opened the 
door for hackers to obtain plain text information. According to a report [7], this incident is the 
largest breach in 2017 in the US. 
 
In order to maintain better healthcare, individuals must ensure that their personal health 
information is private and secure. Otherwise, if patients do not feel that their information remains 
confidential, they may not want to disclose their health information to healthcare providers, which 
could endanger the patient’s life. Moreover, when a security breach occurs, it may lead to financial 
harm for healthcare providers or the patient alike [10]. 
 
1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement 
As healthcare application becomes more and more evidence-based, storing health data is becoming 
more important. Weak health data protection may lead to identity theft, obtaining medical care at 
the expense of others, ordering expensive drugs for resale, and fraudulent insurance claims [3]. 
Moreover, healthcare data hacks may threaten patient’s health due to the change of patient’s 
medical history. For example, if health records do not contain a correct listing of allergies, the 
patient could suffer serious consequences or death due to wrong prescription [4].  
 
Compare to banks and financial institutions, patients’ data has less protection. Banks are mostly 
equipped with two-factor authentication while healthcare applications are not. Two-factor 
authentication is an extra protection which includes not only username and password, but also 
some unique information that only the user has, such as a physical token. Furthermore, unlike bank 
accounts that can be locked and changed for protection, it is completely impossible to get back the 




In the healthcare sector, the HIPAA Meaningful Usage act requires that any data security breaches 
affecting 500 or more patients be reported to public through US Health and Human Service Office 
for Civil Rights' Breach Portal and the affected healthcare provider must take appropriate steps 
within a certain time limit, otherwise, faces further penalties. Thus, PHI leakage not only brings 
reputation problem for healthcare providers, but also affects patient’s privacy and well-being. 
 
Many security vulnerabilities remain undetected for long time [15]. Fixing security vulnerabilities 
becomes more expensive when they are discovered later. Moreover, many security-related 
mistakes are repeated all the time. Static analysis is a method that directly examines the code of a 
program without executing the program. It can detect common vulnerabilities before releasing the 
program. Since manual static analysis takes a long time to be performed, static analysis tools are 
used to speed up the process of evaluating programs. Static analysis tools examine the text of a 
program statically, without attempting to execute it.  Based on our research, there is no work in 
the literature that address whether vulnerability discovered using traditional static code analysis 
can assist in compliance checking of regulatory requirements of HIPAA and ONC. 
 
1.3 Goals, Research Methodology and Contributions 
Given that large scale PHI data security breach occurs in real world, it is imperative to look at the 
implemented EHR and check them if they complied with HIPAA safeguards, particularly technical 
safeguards. However, there is no single tool available in the market that can test an EHR 
application. This thesis brings two prong approaches to address the problem. First, examine EHR 
applications with available code analysis tools. In particular, static analysis tools that are intended 
to reveal implementation vulnerabilities related to traditional computer security breaches including 
data leakage, alteration or deletion. Second, analyze EHR applications at the source-code level to 
secure and harden the code to comply with HIPAA security requirements.  
 
The specific goals of this thesis are to (i) Identify key security requirements of HIPAA framework; 
(ii) Evaluate two open source EHR applications for security vulnerabilities using open source 
scanner tools; (iii) Compare and contrast security vulnerabilities identified by scanner tools with 
HIPAA and ONC security requirements; and (iv) Propose an approach to secure personal health 




The research methodology involves the following activities:  
1. Conduct literature search on existing EHR security and privacy vulnerabilities and their 
prevention technique, on HIPAA Security Requirements, and EHR systems that have been 
tested for HIPAA requirements.  
2. Study and select open source EHR applications and run them to generate dummy PHI data, 
followed by applying open source static code analysis tools to identify security 
vulnerabilities and solutions to address them. 
3. Analyze vulnerabilities and fix them within course code.  
4. Disseminate the work results in the form of publications in related venues.  
 
Our specific contributions to this field of study include: 
1. An in-depth literature survey on state-of-the art approaches for addressing EHR application 
security and privacy [50]. 
2. Analysis of two EHR applications (e.g., OpenEMR, OpenClinic) for security 
vulnerabilities with static analysis tools (RIPS, VulnHunter), and checking the results for 
HIPAA technical security policy violations [51]. 
3. Improving the compliance of EHR applications (e.g., OpenEMR, OpenClinic) using static 









This Chapter presents a literature review of related work on privacy and security vulnerabilities in 
EHRs. In particular, we look at literature works for compliance with HIPAA and ONC 
requirements using four different perspectives: security vulnerability in EHR, access control, 
privacy and monitoring, and the gaps between HIPAA requirements and breach notification. We 
also map some of the existing vulnerabilities to HIPAA and ONC security rules. 
 
2.2 Implementation Vulnerabilities  
Since EHR applications are traditional web applications implemented using various languages 
(e.g., PHP, JSP) and deployed with databases (e.g., MySQL, MSSQL, Oracle) in well-known 
servers (e.g., Apache), they may be vulnerable in their implementations. Attackers may exploit the 
vulnerabilities by providing malicious inputs and compromising the data processed and stored by 
EHR applications. A number of literature works have explored the magnitude of vulnerabilities 
present in popular and open source EHRs and checked whether EHR implementations are 
complying with HIPAA related acts.  
 
Smith et al. [4] empirically evaluated the ability of the Certification Commission of Healthcare IT 
(CCHIT) to identify a range of vulnerability types. CCHIT focuses on required functional 
capabilities in EHR applications, such as ambulatory (with prefix AM), ambulatory 
interoperability, and security (SC).  
 
In a prior study, the authors discussed more than 400 vulnerabilities they discovered using 
automated security testing tools in OpenEMR [1]. In their current work, they tried to observe the 
consequences of the vulnerabilities rather than finding all vulnerabilities of a particular type. The 
authors exploited a range of common vulnerabilities at the code-level and design-level in EHR 
applications. Code-level refers to implementation vulnerabilities and design-level refers to design 
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flaws. Some of the consequences of these exploits were denial of service, users' login information 
exposure, and editing health records by any users.  
 
A team of instructed attackers was created to target the two EHR applications: OpenEMR and 
ProprietaryMed. The attackers' focus was on misuse cases of the CCHIT criteria not the overall 
security of the applications. Misuse cases are defined as actions that are not allowed in the system 
and can help developers to think like an attacker. The test attack environment included OpenEMR 
and ProprietaryMed applications, hacking scripts with additional server, and the researchers' 
computer with WebScarab and Firebug. WebScarab, a Java-based application, was used as a proxy 
to execute testing attacks and record any traffic between the computers and the test servers. Firebug 
was used as JavaScript debugger to monitor the attacks. Firebug is a web development plug-in 
integrates with Firefox and enable users to edit HTML, JavaScript, and Cascading Style Sheets. 
Firebug is also able to executes any script live. Therefore, the researchers did not need an additional 
webpage for storing attacks.  
 
In code vulnerable situations, the following problems occurred while none of them had previously 
been exposed by CCHIT test script: SQL injection, cross-site scripting, session hijacking, 
phishing, PDF exploits, denial of service (file uploads), and authorization failure. Table 1 shows 
the misuse case(s) of vulnerabilities that has not been addressed by CCHIT. Results show that 
CCHIT certification process has two failures: First, when an application meets the security 
requirements, CCHIT test scripts do not test the application for implementation vulnerabilities. 
Second, some security items about patient's health records are not considered at all. It has been 
suggested that misuse cases are added to the manual test script to simulate the attacks. Moreover, 
the test scripts can be more comprehensive by launching various attacks on the host application. 
The manual test scripts should also include the most current list of threats. 
 
Austin et al. [11] discussed insufficient vulnerability discovery techniques from EHR applications. 
Four discovery techniques were applied to EHR applications to understand when to use each type 
of discovery techniques. The evaluated EHR applications were OpenEMR and Tolven eCHR. The 
techniques were systematic and exploratory manual penetration, automated penetration, and static 
analysis. Penetration testing looks at the security of an application from a user perspective and 
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examines the functionality of an application. In manual penetration testing, no automated tools are 
used. Exploratory manual penetration is testing an application based on tester’s prior experience 
and it has no test plan. Systematic penetration testing is a test based on a predefined test plan. 
Automated penetration testing uses automated tools to speed up the process of scanning. Static 
analysis testing examines the code without executing the program. It can be examination of the 
source code, the machine code, or the object code.  
 
Table 1: List of vulnerabilities missing in CCHIT criteria 
Implementation Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerability Misuse Case(s) 
SQL injection Attacker obtains every user's username and password. 
Cross-Site Scripting Attacker causes a denial of service by rendering the home page to be blank 
for all future users.  
Attacker injects scripts that execute additional malicious code. 
Session Hijacking Attacker spoofs another user's identity. Attacker obtains unauthorized access 
to the system. 
Phishing Attacker obtains the victim's username and password. 
PDF Exploits Attacker executes applications on the client's computer.  
Attacker executes embedded applications. 
Denial of Service: File Uploads Attacker renders the web server slow or unresponsive. 
Authorization Failure Attacker creates a new user account with any access privileges the attacker 
desires. 
Design Flaws 
Repudiation Attacker modifies data in an untraceable fashion thus making fraud an 
unperceivable event to the EHR. 
Lack of Authorization Control Attacker views patient's confidential health records and personal 
identification information. 
 
The authors [11] first collected the vulnerabilities detected by each technique, then classified 
vulnerabilities based on being true or false positive (False positive: mistakenly label code as 
contain fault. True positive: when faults are correctly identified). The techniques that generated 
false positives were static analysis and automated penetration testing. The developers need to 
manually examine each potential false report to recognize if they are false positives. Table 2 shows 





Table 2: True and false positive vulnerabilities detected by static analysis and automated 
penetration testing 
Static Analysis 
EHR Application True Positive False Positive False Positive Rate 
Tovlen eCHR 50 2265 98% 
OpenEMR 1321 3715 74% 
Automated Penetration 
Tovlen eCHR 22 15 40% 
OpenEMR 710 25 3% 
 
Some of the detected vulnerabilities were SQL injection, cross-site scripting, system information 
leak, hidden fields, path manipulation, dangerous function, no HTTP Only attribute, dangerous 
file inclusion, file upload abuse, and header manipulation. The authors classified vulnerabilities as 
either implementation vulnerabilities or design flaws. They empirically proved that no single 
technique is sufficient for discovering every type of vulnerability and also there is almost no 
vulnerabilities that can be detected by several techniques. Results showed that systematic manual 
penetration is more efficient than exploratory manual penetration in terms of detecting 
vulnerabilities. Systematic manual penetration was effective at finding design flaws. Static 
analysis detected the largest number of vulnerabilities. Automated penetration was the fastest 
technique, while static analysis, systematic penetration, and manual penetration were ranked in the 
next order respectively.  
 
It is suggested that in case of time constraint, automated penetration is used to detect 
implementation vulnerabilities, and systematic manual penetration for discovering design flaws. 
The study has the following limitations: The selected tools for representing static analysis and 
automated penetration are not a representative of other tools. The authors used just one tool for 
measuring each detection technique, while other tools might detect other types of vulnerabilities. 
The examined EHR applications are not representative of all other software. The classification of 
errors (true positive and false positive) were time consuming and error prone. Human errors can 




2.3 Access Control in EHR  
In EHR applications, access control is one of the necessary security requirements in terms of 
protecting patient information from being compromised [12]. Below is a highlight of some of the 
studies that has been done in this area.  
 
Helms et al. [12] claimed that there has been little effort to evaluate access control vulnerabilities 
in EHR applications. Four EHR applications were evaluated based on 25 criteria related to access 
control. The evaluated EHRs were OpenEMR, OpenMRS, iTrust, and Tolven. The criteria were 
retrieved from HIPAA, Certification Commission for Health Information Technology (CCHIT) 
Criteria, National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) Meaningful Use, and NIST Flat 
role-based access control (RBAC). CCHIT criteria was met by iTrust but other applications were 
configuration dependent. OpenEMR and openMRS are able to create super user roles, which make 
them target of insider attacks. Among all evaluated applications, none of them addressed access 
control during the emergency time. Moreover, the EHR applications failed to allow creating roles 
with separation of duty. Separation of duty prevents a task to be done by just a single user. In 
addition, none of the certification criteria covered the implementation standards.  
 
Oladimeji et al. [21] discussed that traditional access controls are insufficient in ubiquitous 
applications. They proposed a goal-oriented and policy-driven framework to mitigate the security 
and privacy risks of ubiquitous applications in healthcare domain. The framework captures 
application's security and privacy requirements and decreases the threats against those 
requirements. In the proposed framework, these items are modeled: (1) security and privacy 
objectives, (2) threats against those objectives, (3) mitigation strategies in the form of safeguards 
or countermeasures. The authors used emergency response scenario to show the efficiency of the 
framework. 
 
It is mentioned that issues such as untimely arrival of ambulance is a real problem that could 
happened as a result of verbal misinformation, GPS misleading, or imprecise policies guiding. 
Introducing some automated mediation may lead to significant improvement. The eHealth security 
and privacy issues are described in 4 categories: confidentiality, privacy, integrity, and availability. 
The authors [21] mentioned that there are no universal solutions to these issues that fit all ubicomp 
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applications. Therefore, each ubicomp application needs context-sensitive evaluation of what 
threats need to be addressed. 
 
The work of Tuikka et al. [24] is based on systematic literature review of previous studies about 
patients’ involvement in EHR applications. Based on this work, patients' opinion has not been 
properly considered in EHR development. It is suggested that ethical values be considered in 
designing EHRs, and patients’ access to all their records and even able to add some information to 
them. The paper concluded that the best representatives for the patients’ needs are the patients 
themselves not the organizations or advocates. 
 
In 2016, Grunwel et al. [19] discussed the delegation of access in EHR applications and proposed 
an Information Accountability Framework (IAF) to balance the requirements of both healthcare 
professionals and patients in EHR applications. In the framework, patients have explicit control 
over who access and use their information and set usage policies. The IAF framework ensures that 
the right information is available to the right person at the right time. To operationalize the 
framework, it needs to provide for a diverse range of users and use cases. For example, the 
requirement to delegate access to another user on one’s behalf. 
 
2.4 Privacy and Monitoring of EHR Activities 
Privacy protections apply to patient's "individually identifiable health information" [31]. As 
medical records are digitized, patient privacy becomes a more challenging issue [32]. A number 
of studies have discussed the patient privacy and the required monitoring over patient records. 
In order to improve accountability of EHR applications, Mashima et al. [25] presented a patient 
centric monitoring system that monitors all the updates and usage of health information stored in 
EHR/PHR repository. The proposed system uses cryptographic primitives, and allows patients to 
have control over their health record accessibility. However, in this system the monitoring agent 
is assumed trusted.  
 
King et al. [22] discussed that in EHR applications, viewing protected data is often not monitored. 
Therefore, unauthorized views of PHI remain undetected. They proposed a set of principles that 
should be considered during developing logging mechanisms. They monitored the current state of 
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logging mechanisms to capture and prove user's activities in the application. The authors 
supplemented the expected results of existing functional black- box test cases to include log output. 
They used an existing black-box test suite provided by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST). They selected 10 certification criteria from the NIST black- box testing 
including demographics, medication list, medication allergy list, etc. The authors executed the 30 
test cases on EHR applications. 67.8% of applicable executed test cases failed. Four of failed cases 
was related to viewing of critical data, showing that users may view protected information without 
being captured.  
 
In order to meet HIPAA's privacy requirements, Reinsmidt et al. [23] proposed an approach that 
provides a secure connected mobile system in a mobile cloud environment. The connection 
between mobile systems takes place using authentication and encryption. The protocol execution 
includes encryption, decryption, and key generation time. After a mobile device opens a socket 
with the listening server, the server responds with its public part of the DH exchange. The mobile 
device hashes the results with SHA-256 to calculate the symmetric encryption/decryption key. 
This key is used in the advanced encryption standard (AES).  
 
Kingsford et al. [26] proposed a mathematical framework to improve the preservation of patient's 
privacy in EMR applications during the collection of patient health data for analysis. The authors 
used an identity based encryption (IBE) protocol. In the proposed framework, patient's identity is 
delinked from the health data before submitting to health workers for analysis. Health data is 
encrypted before submitting. The administrator then decrypts the submitted data. Patient’s identity 
is delinked from submitted data in this stage. The administrator checks that only the health data 
(not the identity of the patient) is sent to health worker for analysis. Therefore, the identity of the 
patient will not be disclosed and PU’s privacy is preserved.  
 
Gaps between security policies and real breaches always exist in healthcare. Policies are often 
stated in an ambiguous manner [27, 28]. Therefore, in reality not all the breaches are addressed by 
policies. To measure the breach coverage percentage by HIPAA security policies, Kafali et al. [30] 
proposed a semantic reasoning framework to identify gaps between HIPAA policy and security 
breaches. The work revealed that only 65% of security breaches are covered by HIPAA policy 
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rules. Moreover, HIPAA security policy is more successful in covering malicious misuse than 
accidental misuse.  
 
Compared to previous literature works, our work contributed to checking the compliance of EHR 
applications with HIPAA (technical security requirements) and ONC (focused on security and 
privacy) criteria. In particular, none of the work has explored the issue of whether there is any link 






OpenEMR and OpenClinic Compliance with HIPAA 
 
3.1 Overview 
EHR applications are deployed over the web, leading to potential common security vulnerabilities 
such as SQL Injection, cross-site scripting, file inclusion, HTTP response splitting, and flow 
control alteration. In this chapter, we start with a review of these common security vulnerabilities 
in EHR applications. Then focus on the compliance of selected EHR applications with HIPAA 
technical requirements. The selected code analysis tools, named RIPS [16] and PHP VulnHunter 
[47], are used to examine the code of OpenEMR and OpenClinic [33]. The results obtained from 
the tools are then manually inspected for accuracy to form a basis for compliance with HIPAA 
technical requirements due to traditional web security vulnerabilities.  
 
3.2 Common Web Security Vulnerabilities  
SQL Injection: SQL injection is a code injection attack that occurs when an application does not 
sanitize untrusted input properly. Therefore, an attacker can inject reserved words into input fields, 
executes malicious SQL statements, and change the logical structures of SQL statements [4, 18].  
 
Cross-Site Scripting: In a cross-site scripting attack, an attacker injects malicious code into the 
trusted web application that does not properly validate the user input. Therefore, a victim can run 
the malicious code into the browser. Cross-site scripting is a threat for users, not the application 
itself [4, 29].  
 
Reflection Injection Attack: Reflection is the computer ability to inspect itself and describe the 
properties, methods and types of objects that the user is working with. In reflection injection attack, 
tainted data is used as a function name which may lead to execution of arbitrary functions and 
unexpected behavior of the application. Reflection injection may also lead to a specific code 




File Inclusion: This vulnerability occurs due to poor input validation when an attacker is allowed 
to exploit external file inclusion functionality that dynamically includes local or external files. It 
will lead to the execution of malicious code or unauthorized access to sensitive files [20, 36].   
 
HTTP Response Splitting: In HTTP response splitting attack, malicious data is embedded in 
HTTP response headers. HTTP response is split into two responses instead of one. This attack can 
lead to other vulnerabilities including cross-site scripting [37, 38]. 
 
Flow Control: Flow control attacks occur as a result of injecting malicious user input into the 
program counter. Flow control attacks are the subversion of the program execution due to 
tampering with program code. This vulnerability may result in execution of unintended code [39, 
40].  
 
Protocol Injection: It occurs when attacker change the connection handling parameters. User 
tainted data may be used when selecting those parameters [16].  
 
File Disclosure: In File Disclosure vulnerability, an attacker can read local files. User tainted data 
is used when creating the file name that is supposed to get opened. Therefore, the attacker can read 
the source code and other files which might lead to other attacks [16].  
 
File Manipulation: An attacker can inject code into a file or write to arbitrary files. User tainted 
data is used when creating the file name that is supposed to get opened or when creating the string 
that will be written to the file. An attacker can try to write arbitrary PHP code in a PHP file allowing 
to fully compromising the server [16].  
 
3.3 HIPAA Security Requirements 
Although EHRs resulted in better care, concerns of security and privacy breach always exist among 
digital formats. HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act) was established in 
1996 to protect health care coverage for individuals with lower income [41]. It provides federal 
protections for patient health information [14] by specifying measures to ensure EHR 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability [13]. HIPAA security requirements are divided into three 
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types: Administrative, Physical, and Technical (See Appendix E). The administrative safeguards 
are described as policies and procedures designed to manage the selection, development, 
implementation, and maintenance of security measures. The physical safeguards are physical 
measures, policies, and procedures to protect an equipment, from natural and environmental 
hazards, and unauthorized intrusion. Finally, the technical safeguards are the technology and the 
policy-related requirements that protect electronic protected health information (EPHI) and control 
access to it [54, 55, 56].  
 
Table 3 shows a set of HIPAA technical requirements. The first column of the table refers to 
applicable sections of HIPAA law on security requirements. For example, Section 164.312 
specifies all technical safeguards that a covered entity must comply with. These include 
implementing access control through unique user identification, emergency access to PHI 
procedure, automatic logoff after a time of inactivity, encrypt and decrypt PHI, audit the access 
and usage of PHI, detection of improper access and alteration of PHI, verification of the integrity 
of received PHI electronically, and authentication (verify that an individual seeking access to PHI 
is recognized based on provided credential information) [42]. 
 
The second column shows high-level requirements to ensure safeguards. The requirement can be 
referring to other guidelines. The third column (status) refers whether a safeguard is required or 
addressable. The required rules are mandatory for all EHR applications and not implementing them 
leads fines and penalties [43]. The addressable rules are optional features that should be 
implemented in EHR so that PHI remains secured. 
 
In this research, we focus on issues related to Technical Safeguards. If technical safeguards are 
complied with in an implemented EHR, then it enables not only meeting some of the other types 
of safeguards (e.g., providing tools and applications to check and monitor administrative security 
policies), but also can prevent unwanted incidents (due to not complying physical safeguards). For 
example, if a laptop having an EHR application gets lost or stolen, it would be very difficult to 





Table 3: HIPAA technical safeguard checklist 
Security Rule 
Reference 
Technical Safeguard Status  
164.312(a)(1) 
(Access Control) 
Access Controls: Implement technical policies and procedures for 
electronic information systems that maintain EPHI to allow access 
only to those persons or software programs that have been granted 
access rights as specified in Sec. 164.308(a)(4).  
 
164.312(a)(2)(i) 
(Identify and track 
user identity) 





Establish (and implement as needed) procedures for obtaining 





Implement procedures that terminate an electronic session after a 




Implement a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt EPHI. ADDRESSABLE 
164.312(b) 
(Audit Controls) 
Implement Audit Controls, hardware, software, and/or procedural 
mechanisms that record and examine activity in information 




Integrity: Implement policies and procedures to protect EPHI from 




Implement electronic mechanisms to corroborate that EPHI has 




Implement Person or Entity Authentication procedures to verify 





Transmission Security: Implement technical security measures to 
guard against unauthorized access to EPHI that is being 





Implement security measures to ensure that electronically 
transmitted EPHI is not improperly modified without detection 











3.4 Evaluation of OpenEMR and OpenClinic  
To uncover potential web security vulnerabilities, we have used RIPS and PHP VulnHunter [16] 
static analysis tools on OpenEMR and OpenClinic [1], two open source EHR applications 
currently being adopted and used in the real world. We used Windows operating system to install 
the tools and EHR applications, and deployed Apache server and MySQL database.  
 
Note static analysis tools do not run applications, instead scan source of the applications for known 
pattern of vulnerabilities. The tools are restricted to their application based on the implementation 
languages of the EHR applications (which was PHP in our study). Dynamic analysis tools have 
the capability of running applications with inputs, and inspect various states of applications to 
identify anomalies or security bugs. In our study, we found few to no support for dynamic analysis 
tool support at this time for PHP-based web applications. Given that our focus was using static 
analysis tools. 
 
OpenEMR is a PHP-based application that uses Apache as the web server and MySQL as the 
database server. OpenEMR is under the GNU Public License (GPL). It can be installed on UNIX, 
Microsoft, and Mac OS X platforms. It contains many essential features for clinical practices such 
as feeding data of patient (e.g., biographic data, diagnostic results, medication history) as EHR, 
disease management, scheduling, and electronic billing. OpenEMR is one of the most popular free 
EHR systems with over 7000 downloads per month. It has been downloaded more than 500,000 
times since March 2005 [44, 45, 46]. In this work, we scanned all 5594 files in OpenEMR.  
 
OpenClinic is a platform independent, PHP-based EHR application which has been mainly used 
in private clinics and private doctors. It requires MySQL and a web server for executing PHP code 
(like Apache). OpenClinic is under GNU General Public License (GPL) [33]. In this project, we 
scanned all 170 files in OpenClinic.  
 
RIPS is a tool for automated identification of vulnerabilities in PHP applications. In open-source 
version of RIPS, PHP code is tokenized and transformed into a program model for scanning. RIPS 
then detects vulnerable functions that an attacker can provide with malicious inputs. RIPS detects 
a number of vulnerability types including cross-site scripting, SQL injection, and local file 
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inclusion. RIPS is capable of identifying a large number of vulnerabilities, including Code 
Execution, Command Execution, Cross-Site Scripting, Header Injection, File Disclosure, File 
Inclusion, File Manipulation, LDAP Injection, SQL Injection, Unserialize with POP, and XPath 
Injection [16, 17]. 
 
PHP VulnHunter is a static analysis tool which scans php vulnerabilities automatically. In fact, it 
uses a combination of static and dynamic analysis to automatically map the target application. It 
scans a large number of vulnerabilities in PHP web applications. PHP Vulnerability Hunter can 
detect the following classes of vulnerabilities: Arbitrary command execution, Arbitrary file 
read/write/change/rename/delete, Local file inclusion, Arbitrary PHP execution, SQL injection, 
User controlled function invocation, User controlled class instantiation, Reflected cross-site 
scripting (XSS), Open redirect, Full path disclosure [47, 48]. 
 
3.5 Results 
The results of applying static analysis tools to OpenEMR and OpenClinic are shown in Tables 4, 
5. Table 4 shows identified vulnerabilities by RIPS and PHP VulnHunter, while table 5 provides 
some code examples of the detected vulnerable files. Finally in table 6, we show the compliance 
of the two evaluated EHRs (OpenEMR and OpenClinic) with the HIPAA technical safeguards 
based on our observation. OpenEMR has 5000+ source files, and it took more than 3 hours of time 
to be scanned by RIPS and VulnHunter. In contrast, OpenClinic has much less source files and 
took about half an hour of time by the tools. 
 
TABLE 4: Detected vulnerabilities in OpenEMR and OpenClinic 
Vulnerability OpenEMR OpenClinic 
 RIPS VulnHunter RIPS VulnHunter 
File Inclusion ✓ ✓ - - 
Cross-Site Scripting ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
SQL Injection - - - ✓ 
HTTP Response Splitting ✓ - ✓ - 
Reflection Injection ✓ - - - 
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Flow Control ✓ - - - 
Protocol Injection ✓ - - - 
File Disclosure ✓ ✓ ✓ - 
File Manipulation ✓ - ✓ - 
 
According to Table 4, Cross-Site Scripting was detected in both applications by both tools, while 
SQL Injection, Reflection Injection, Flow Control, and Protocol Injection were least detected 
vulnerabilities. 
 
In Table 5, we show code example for vulnerabilities and describe how the presented code can 
lead to the associated vulnerability. 
 
Table 5: Code examples of vulnerable files in OpenEMR and OpenClinic 
Vulnerability Code Example Description 
File Inclusion require_once "sites/$site_id/sqlconf.php"; 
 
$site_id = 'default'; 
 
$site_id = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']; 
 
The function require_once and $_SERVER 






$_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET); 
The function echo and $_GET together can 
cause Cross-Site Scripting vulnerability. 
SQL Injection mysql_query('USE ' . $_POST['dbName']) or 
die(sprintf(_("Instruction: %s Error: %s"), $sql, 
mysql_error())); 
The function mysql_query and $_ POST 








$site_id = 'default'; 
 
$site_id = $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST']; 
 
The function header and $_SERVER 






call_user_func_array (array(&$obj, $func), 
array($var, $_POST)); 
 
function populate_object (&$job); 
 
$func = "set_" . $varname;  
 
$varname = preg_replace("/[^A-Za-z0-9_]/",  
"",  $varname); 
 
foreach ($_POST as $varname=>$var) 
 
The function call_user_func_array and 
$_POST together can cause Reflection 
Injection vulnerability. 
Flow Control extract ($_GET, EXTR_SKIP); 
 
$_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET); 
The function extract and $_GET together 




fsockopen fsockopen(($this->ssl"ssl://" : "") . 
$ip, $port, $errno, $error, $this->timeout) :  
 
 $ip = gethostbyname($domain), $domain))  
⇓ Function connecttohost($domain, $port, 
$resolve_message) 
 
The function fsockopen and $_GET 
together can cause Protocol Injection 
vulnerability. 
File Disclosure  fread $filetext = fread($tmpfile, 
$_FILES['file']['size'][$key]);  
 
 $tmpfile = 
fopen($_FILES['file']['tmp_name'][$key], "r");  
 
The function fread and $_FILES together 
can cause File Disclosure vulnerability. 
File 
Manipulation 
chmod chmod($destinationFile, 0644);   
 
$destinationFile = $destinationDir . '/' . 
$destinationName;   
 
 function upload(&$file, $destinationDir = "", 
$destinationName = "", $secure = true) 
 
$destinationName = $file['name'];   
 
function upload(&$file, $destinationDir = "", 
$destinationName = "", $secure = true) 
 
The function chmod and $_GET together 
can cause File Manipulation vulnerability. 
 
File inclusion may lead to unauthorized access and consequently alternation of PHI [20, 36]. This 
vulnerability violates HIPAA rules for Access Control (Security rule 164.312(a)(1)) and Integrity 




In cross-site scripting, an attacker can cause a denial of service by rendering the home page to be 
blank for all future users or inject scripts that execute additional malicious code [29]. Therefore, 
authorized users may fail to access the PHI during emergency time. This vulnerability violates 
HIPAA rules for Access Control (Security rule 164.312(a)(1)) and Integrity of the EHR application 
(Security rule 164.312(c)(1)).  
 
In SQL injection attack, an attacker injects reserved words into input fields, executes 
malicious SQL statements, and change the logical structures of SQL statements [18]. This 
vulnerability violates HIPAA rules for Access Control (Security rule 164.312(a)(1)) and Integrity 
of the EHR application (Security rule 164.312(c)(1)).  
 
HTTP response splitting leads to other vulnerabilities including cross-site scripting, which may 
disrupt authorized access to the system and cause denial of service [37, 38]. This vulnerability 
violates HIPAA rules for Access Control (Security rule 164.312(a)(1)) and Integrity of the EHR 
application (Security rule 164.312(c)(1)).  
 
Reflection injection may allow an attacker to gain access to the PHI and result in specific code 
injection [34, 35]. This violates HIPAA rules for Access Control (Security rule 164.312(a)(1)) and 
Integrity of the EHR application (Security rule 164.312(c)(1)).  
 
Flow control attacks may result in execution of unintended code, which could result in a denial of 
service [39, 40]. This can cause problem especially during emergency time. Flow control attacks 
violate HIPAA rule for access during emergency time (Security rule 164.312(a)(2)(ii)).  
 
In protocol injection vulnerability, user tainted data may be used when selecting and changing the 
connection handling parameters [16]. This violates HIPAA rules for Access Control (Security rule 
164.312(a)(1)) and Integrity of the EHR application (Security rule 164.312(c)(1)).  
 
In file disclosure vulnerability, an attacker can read files. User tainted data is used when creating 
the file name that is supposed to be opened. Therefore, the attacker can read the source code and 
other files, which might lead to other attacks [16]. This vulnerability violates HIPAA rules for 
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Access Control (Security rule 164.312(a)(1)) and Integrity of the EHR application (Security rule 
164.312(c)(1)).  
 
In file manipulation vulnerability, an attacker can inject code into a file or write to arbitrary files 
[16]. This violates HIPAA rules for Access Control (Security rule 164.312(a)(1)) and Integrity of 
the EHR application (Security rule 164.312(c)(1)).  
 
OpenEMR also failed to address encryption and decryption of PHI. There were no functions such 
as crypt() for encryption and  md5() for data hashing. This obviously violates HIPAA rule for 
encryption and decryption of PHI (Security rule 164.312(a)(2)(iv)). 
 
Table 6 shows the compliance of evaluated EHRs (OpenEMR and OpenClinic) with the HIPAA 
technical safeguards based on our observation. 
 
Table 6: EHRs compliance with HIPAA technical requirements 
HIPAA Technical Requirements OpenEMR OpenClinic 
164.312(a)(1) 
Access Controls No No 
164.312(a)(2)(i) 
Identify and track user identity Yes No 
164.312(a)(2)(ii) 
Emergency access No No 
164.312(a)(2)(iii) 
Automatic Log-Off Yes Yes 
164.312(a)(2)(iv) 
Encryption No No 
164.312(b) 
Audit Controls Yes No 
164.312(c)(1) 
Integrity No No 
164.312(c)(2) 
(Integrity) N/A N/A 
164.312(d) 
(Authentication) N/A N/A 
164.312(e)(1) 




(Transmission Security) N/A N/A 
164.312(e)(2)(ii) 
(Encryption) N/A N/A 
 
In the next chapter, the resulted obtained from the scanning tools are manually inspected for 







Compliance Checking for ONC Security and Privacy Requirements  
 
4.1 Overview 
In chapter 3, we applied two popular code analysis tools, named RIPS and PHP VulnHunter to 
examine the code in OpenEMR and OpenClinic [16, 33]. Then we inspected the obtained results 
and manually checked the accuracy to form a basis for compliance with HIPAA technical 
requirements. In this chapter, we inspect the obtained results from chapter 3, and check the 
accuracy to form a basis for compliance with ONC privacy and security-focused requirements 
[49]. The initial results show that both evaluated EHRs may violate some required and optional 
HIPAA and ONC privacy and security requirements. 
 
It is important to note that in some instances, HIPAA and ONC criteria may appear to overlap. For 
example, both HIPAA and ONC define a unique identifier for each user as well as automatic log-
off after a predetermined period of inactivity. However, they were examined on an individual basis 
due to the severity of ramifications associated with non-compliance. Non-compliance with the 
HIPAA criteria has far worse implications than not meeting ONC criteria. In some cases, the two 
criteria address different requirements. For example, ONC requires EHR applications to allow a 
user to capture a patient’s request for an amendment to their electronic health information. 
 
4.2 Compliance with ONC Certification 
In this section, we discuss ONC Certification Program, which is required for eligible providers 
seeking to demonstrate "meaningful use" [49]. Meaningful use is the minimum government 
standards for using and exchanging patients' health information. ONC certification has several 
criteria including Clinical Processes, Care Coordination, Clinical Quality Measurement, Privacy 
and Security, Patient Engagement, Public Health, Health IT Design and Performance, and 
Electronic Exchange. In this work, we considered Privacy and Security criteria and studied the 
compliance of the two evaluated EHRs (OpenEMR and OpenClinic) with Privacy and Security 




Table 7 shows the 2015 Edition of ONC certification criteria for EHR privacy and security.  
 




45 CFR §170.314(d)(1) 
Authentication, Access Control, and Authorization: EHR must authenticate and 
authorize a user, and control user access to the information. 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(2) 
Auditable Events and Tamper-Resistance: EHR must: Record user actions in an 
audit log; Record audit log status or encryption status; Only enable specific users to 
disable an audit log, if possible; Protect actions and statuses; and Detect when the 
audit log has been altered. 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(3) 
Audit Report(s): EHR must allow a user to generate an audit report for a specific 
time period. 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(4) 
Amendments: EHR must allow a user to capture a patient’s request for an 
amendment to their electronic health information.  
45 CFR §170.314(d)(5) 
Automatic Log-Off: EHR must log-off users automatically after a predetermined 
period of inactivity. 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(6) 
Emergency Access: EHR must permit specific users to have access to the 
electronic health information in the event of an emergency.  
45 CFR §170.314(d)(7) 
End-User Device Encryption: EHR must encrypt electronic health information on 
end-user devices. 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(8) 
Integrity:  EHR must use secure hashing standards to ensure that electronic health 
information has not been altered. 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(9) 
Optional – Accounting of Disclosures: EHR must record treatment, payment, and 
health care operations disclosures.  
 
Table 8 shows the compliance of the two evaluated EHRs (OpenEMR and OpenClinic) with the 





Table 8: EHR compliance with ONC certification criteria 
Certification Criterion OpenEMR OpenClinic 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(1) 
Authentication, Access Control, and Authorization Yes Yes 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(2)  
Auditable Events and Tamper-Resistance Yes No 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(3)  
Audit Report(s) 
Yes No 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(4) 
Amendments 
Yes No 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(5) 
Automatic Log-Off 
Yes Yes 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(6) 
Emergency Access 
No No 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(7) 
End-User Device Encryption 
No No 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(8) 
Integrity 
No No 
45 CFR §170.314(d)(9) 
Accounting of Disclosures 
N/A N/A 
 
According to Table 8, OpenEMR and OpenClinic failed to meet the ONC Criteria during 
emergency time. Also, End-User Device Encryption and Integrity were not addressed by the 
EHRs. OpenEMR supported other ONC criteria while OpenClinic failed to address most of the 
cases.  
 
4.3 Improving Compliance 
To improve compliance, we developed and implemented code solutions to address some of the 
security vulnerabilities found in evaluated EHR applications. We then rescanned the new code 
with the two static analysis tools and found no vulnerability.  Table 9 provides some examples of 
identified unsanitized code in EHRs and how we fixed the code to improve the compliance with 
HIPAA and ONC security requirements. Below we briefly explain two examples of fixing 
vulnerable code in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Code examples of vulnerable EHR files and the solution code. 
Vulnerability Vulnerable Code Example Fixed Code Example 
Cross-Site Scripting: 
$_POST + echo() 
echo echo " durations[" . 
$crow['pc_catid'] . "] = $duration\n";  
 
$duration = $_POST['form_duration'];   
print ("Hello "  .  htmlentities($_GET["name"],  
ENT_QUOTES,  "utf-8");  









"/sqlconf.php";  // sqlconf.php); 
$tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];   
$files  =  array("index.php",  "main.php");  
if(!in_array($_GET["file"],  $files)) exit ;   
code was changed to:  
$tmp = empty($_GET['site']) ? 'default' : if 
(!in_array($_GET['site'], $site))exit; 
File Manipulation: 
$_GET + mkdir() 
mkdir 
mkdir($GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . 
'/documents/mpdf/pdf_tmp/', 0755);   
$tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];   
$files  =  array("index.php",  "main.php");  
if(!in_array($_GET["file"],  $files)) exit ;   
code was changed to:   
$tmp = empty($_GET['site']) ? 'default' : if 
(!in_array($_GET['site'], $site))exit; 
File Disclosure: 
$_FILES + fread()  
fread $filetext = fread($tmpfile, 




$files  =  array("index.php",  "main.php");  
if(!in_array($_GET["file"],  $files)) exit ;   
Http response 
splitting: $_GET + 
header()  
header header("Content-
Length: " . filesize($tmpcouchpath)); 
$GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLO
BALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . '/' . $tmp;   
$tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];   
if(!in_array($_GET["url"],  $whitelist)) exit ;   
 
In a cross-site scripting attack, an attacker injects malicious code into the trusted web application 
that does not properly validate the user input. Cross-site scripting may occur when function echo() 
comes with the $_GET (or $_POST). To fix this vulnerability, we used htmlentities() function, 
which converts all applicable characters to HTML entities.  
 
File inclusion occurs due to poor input validation when an attacker is allowed to exploit external 
file inclusion functionality that dynamically includes local or external files. File inclusion may 
occur when function require_once() comes with the $_GET (or $_POST). Function require_once() 
works almost as function include(). Not limiting the file name to specific paths or extensions is 
one way to avoid file inclusion. To ensure that, we added if (!in_array($_GET["file"],  $files)) exit 




The third row (second column) shows an example of file manipulation where user input 
($_GET[‘site’]) could lead to a default file creation within the local file server of a website. The 
fixed code (third column) shows one solution where acceptable file names are whitelisted into an 
array ($files). If user input is empty, a default file is created, otherwise user input is matched with 
known filenames. Similarly, we have addressed file disclosure issue during file reading in the 
fourth row of Table 9.  
 
In file disclosure attack, an attacker can read local files. User tainted data is used when creating 
the file name that is supposed to get opened. Therefore, the attacker can read the source code and 
other files which might lead to other attacks. File disclosure may occur when function fread() 
comes with $_FILES. To fix this vulnerability, we added if(!in_array($_GET["file"],  $files)) exit; 
to make sure that the attacker cannot read the source code.    
 
The last row of Table 9 shows HTTP response splitting. In HTTP response splitting attack, 
malicious data is embedded in HTTP response headers. HTTP response is split into two responses 
instead of one. This vulnerability can occur when function header() comes with $_GET (or 
$_POST). To address this issue, we used if(!in_array($_GET["url"],  $whitelist)) exit; which 
prevents from spilt the HTTP response into two responses. 
 
Note our suggested fixed examples highlights the need of using specific APIs available in the 
implementation language (e.g., htmlentities() in PHP), or adding the needed code for checking of 
entities from white or black list, to prevent vulnerabilities. It may not be possible to provide one 
common solution for multiple vulnerabilities due to implementation of input filtering can vary 
from application to application. 
 
The fixing of code took much less time once we have a common API pattern (e.g., htmlentities()) 
identified for finding and replacing with the correct code. However, for checking of whitelisting 








Electronic Health Record applications are digital versions of paper-based patient's health 
information. They are increasingly being implemented in many countries. They have resulted in 
better healthcare, lower costs, easier follow ups, and more precise medical decisions. EHR 
applications are guided by measures of HIPAA to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and security. 
However, concerns of security breach always exist in digital formats. In many reported breaches, 
improper use of EHRs has resulted in disclosure of patient’s protected health information. 
Therefore, more awareness in existing EHRs capability of protecting patient’s healthcare data is 
needed. 
  
We conducted a survey of literature search focused on relevant works about EHR security and 
privacy vulnerabilities, complying with HIPAA and ONC security and privacy requirements; 
identified key security requirements of HIPAA and ONC framework; evaluated selected open 
source EHR applications for security vulnerabilities using open source scanner tools; compared 
and contrasted security vulnerabilities identified by scanner tools with HIPAA and ONC security 
requirements; and proposed an approach to secure personal health identifier information within 
applications.  
 
We identified security and privacy requirements for HIPAA technical requirements, and identified 
a subset of ONC criteria related to security and privacy. Then we evaluated EHR applications for 
security vulnerabilities, and finally proposed mitigation of security issues towards better 
compliance. The proposed approach helps practitioners to reuse the open source tools towards 
certification compliance. 
 
Our future work includes the evaluation of other open-source EHR applications and using 
additional and different static analysis tools. We also plan to evaluate the effectiveness of our 
proposed solution by using dynamic analysis tools. 
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Appendix A: RIPS Results for OpenEMR 
Vulnerability Vulnerability Concept File(s) 
File Disclosure Source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + require_once() = File Inclusion 
 
19: require_once require_once $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . 
"/sqlconf.php";  // sqlconf.php 
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 




File Disclosure Source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + opendir() = File Disclosure 
 
57: opendir $dh = opendir($templatedir);  
54: $templatedir = $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . 
'/documents/doctemplates';  
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 








File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 





File Disclosure  
73: readfile readfile($finalZip);  
63: $finalZip = $qrda_file_path . $fileList[0];  // if(count($fileList) > 1) 
else , 
55: $qrda_file_path = $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . 
"/documents/cqm_qrda/";  // qrda_category1.inc 
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
43: $fileList = explode(",", $fileName);  
39: $fileName = $_GET['fileName'] : "";  






File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_POST + parse_ini_file() = File Disclosure 
 
45: parse_ini_file $config = parse_ini_file($config_file);  // 
gacl_admin.inc.php 
40: $config_file = dirname(__FILE__) . '/../gacl.ini.php';  // 
gacl_admin.inc.phpif(!isset($config_file)), 
59: $config_file = '';  // gacl.class.php 
509: extract($_POST, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 











source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET 
$_POST + mail() = Protocol Injection 
 
45: mail mail($pt_email, $email_subject, $email_body, $headers)) // 
batchEmail.php 
32: $pt_email = $row['email'];  // batchEmail.php 
28: $row = sqlfetcharray ($res)){ // batchEmail.php 
125: $res = sqlstatement ($sql);  
122: $sql .= ' ORDER BY ' . $_POST['sort_by'];  
117: $sql .= " $and patient_data.email IS NOT NULL ";  // 
switch($_POST) : , case $choices : , 
111: $sql .= " $and patient_data.hipaa_mail='YES' ";  // if($_POST != 
'NO'), 
105: $sql .= " $and patient_data.sex='" . $_POST['gender'] . "' ";  // 
if($_POST != 'Any'), 
99: $sql .= " $and DATEDIFF( CURDATE( ), patient_data.DOB )/ 
365.25 <= '" . $_POST['age_upto'] . "' ";  // if($_POST != 0 AND $_POST 
!= ''), 
95: $sql .= " $and DATEDIFF( CURDATE( ), patient_data.DOB )/ 
365.25 >= '" . $_POST['age_from'] . "' ";  // if($_POST != 0 AND 
$_POST != ''), 
89: $sql .= " $and forms.date > '" . $_POST['seen_since'] . "' ";  // 
if($_POST != 0 AND $_POST != ''), 
85: $sql .= " $and forms.date > '" . $_POST['seen_since'] . "' ";  // 
if($_POST != 0 AND $_POST != ''), 
80: $sql .= $sql_where_a; 
70: $sql = "select patient_data.*, cal_events.pc_eventDate as 
next_appt,cal_events.pc_startTime as 
appt_start_time,cal_date.last_appt,forms.last_visit from patient_data left 
outer join openemr_postcalendar_events as cal_events on 
patient_data.pid=cal_events.pc_pid and curdate() < 
cal_events.pc_eventDate left outer join (select pc_pid,max(pc_eventDate) 
as last_appt from openemr_postcalendar_events where curdate() >= 
pc_eventDate group by pc_pid ) as cal_date on 
cal_date.pc_pid=patient_data.pid left outer join (select pid,max(date) as 
last_visit from forms where curdate() >= date group by pid) as forms on 
forms.pid=patient_data.pid";  
78: $sql_where_a .= " $and cal_events.pc_endDate < '" . $_POST['app_e'] 
. "'";  // if($_POST != 0 AND $_POST != ''), 
74: $sql_where_a = " $and cal_events.pc_eventDate > '" . 
$_POST['app_s'] . "'";  // if($_POST != 0 AND $_POST != ''), 
73: $and = where_or_and ($and);  // if($_POST != 0 AND $_POST != ''), 
509: extract($_POST, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 
43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
508: extract($_GET, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
509: extract($_POST, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 
43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
508: extract($_GET, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 






43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
508: extract($_GET, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
509: extract($_POST, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 
43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
77: $and = where_or_and ($and);  // if($_POST != 0 AND $_POST != ''), 





source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + fgets() = File Disclosure 
33: fgets $line = fgets($fh)){ 
31: $fh = fopen($filename, 'r');  
28: $filename = $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . '/edi/process_bills.log';  
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 









source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + fpassthru() = File Disclosure 
39: fpassthru fpassthru($fp);  
29: $fp = fopen($fname, 'r');  
22: $fname = $claim_file_dir . $fname;  
11: $claim_file_dir = $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . "/edi/";  
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
16: $fname = preg_replace("[\\\\]", "", $fname);  
15: $fname = preg_replace("[\.\.]", "", $fname);  
14: $fname = preg_replace("[/]", "", $fname);  
13: $fname = $_GET['key'];  





File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + scandir() = File Disclosure 
98: scandir $files_array = scandir($mainPATH);  
61: $mainPATH = $GLOBALS['fileroot'] . "/contrib/" . strtolower($db);  
152: $GLOBALS['fileroot'] = "$webserver_root";  // globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
60: $db = $_GET['db'] : '0';  





File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + file_get_contents() = File Disclosure 
228: file_get_contents $file_checksum = md5(file_get_contents($file));  
110: $file = $mainPATH . "/" . $file;  
61: $mainPATH = $GLOBALS['fileroot'] . "/contrib/" . strtolower($db);  
152: $GLOBALS['fileroot'] = "$webserver_root";  // globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
60: $db = $_GET['db'] : '0';  
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
108: foreach($files_array as $file) 






File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 




File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_POST + opendir() = File Disclosure 
 
interface\fax/faxq.php 
File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET 




File Disclosure source  Sink  Vulnerability 
$_GET + fgets() = File Disclosure 
 
interface\fax/fax_view.php 
File Disclosure - interface\forms/CAMOS/ad
min.php 
File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + imagecreatefrompng() = File Disclosure 
 
539: imagecreatefrompng $im = imagecreatefrompng($chartpath . 
$chart);  
36: $chartpath = $GLOBALS['fileroot'] . 
"/interface/forms/vitals/growthchart/";  
152: $GLOBALS['fileroot'] = "$webserver_root";  // globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
197: $chart = "2-20yo_girls_BMI.png";  // elseif($charttype == "2-20"), 
elseif(preg_match('/^female/i', $patient_data)), 
190: $chart = "2-20yo_boys_BMI.png";  // elseif($charttype == "2-20"), 
if(preg_match('/^male/i', $patient_data)), 
143: $chart = "birth-24mos_girls_HC.png";  // if($charttype == 'birth'), 
elseif(preg_match('/^female/i', $patient_data)), 
136: $chart = "birth-24mos_boys_HC.png";  // if($charttype == 'birth'), 
if(preg_match('/^male/i', $patient_data)), 
417: extract(getpatientageymd ($dob, $date));  // register_globals 
implementationif($_GET == 1), 
51: $dob = $patient_data['DOB'];  // if(isset($pid) && is_numeric($pid)), 
49: $patient_data = getpatientdata ($pid, "fname, lname, sex, 
DATE_FORMAT(DOB,'%Y%m%d') as DOB");  // if(isset($pid) && 
is_numeric($pid)), 
39: $pid = $_GET['pid'];  
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
407: list($date, $height, $weight, $head_circ) = explode('-', $data);  // 
list() if($_GET == 1), 
406: foreach($datapoints as $data) // if($_GET == 1), 
59: $datapoints = explode('~', $_GET['data']);  







File Disclosure Source  sink  Vulnerability 
$_GET 
$_POST + glob() = File Disclosure 
320: glob glob($filepath . '/' . $filename) as  
319: $filepath = $GLOBALS['oer_config']['documents']['repository'] . 
$pid;  
235: $pid = $_SESSION['pid'];  
474: $_SESSION['pid'] = $_POST['pid'];  // 
globals.phpelseif(!empty($_POST) && empty($_SESSION)), 
43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
318: $filename = $pid . "_" . $encounter . ".pdf";  
235: $pid = $_SESSION['pid'];  
474: $_SESSION['pid'] = $_POST['pid'];  // 
globals.phpelseif(!empty($_POST) && empty($_SESSION)), 
43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 




File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
    
$_POST + file() = File Disclosure 
177: file $form_title_file = file($GLOBALS['srcdir'] . 
"/../interface/forms/$fname/info.txt");  
426: $srcdir = $GLOBALS['srcdir'];  // globals.php 
150: $GLOBALS['srcdir'] = "$webserver_root/library";  // globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
160: foreach($inDir as $fname) 
148: $inDir[$i] = $fname;  // if($fname != "." && $fname != ".." && 
$fname != "CVS" && $fname != "LBF" && (is_dir($dpath . $fname) || 
stristr($fname, ".tar.gz") || stristr($fname, ".tar") || stristr($fname, ".zip") || 
stristr($fname, ".gz"))), 
143: $fname = readdir($dp));  
141: $dp = opendir($dpath);  // , trace stopped 
509: extract($_POST, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 







File Disclosure 56: fread $bat_content = fread($fd, filesize($error_log_path . '/' . 
$filename));  
55: $fd = fopen($error_log_path . '/' . $filename, 'r')){ 
35: $error_log_path = $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . 
'/documents/erx_error';  
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
40: $filename = '';  // if(array_key_exists('filename', $_REQUEST)) else , 
interface\logview/erx_logvi
ew.php 
Session Fixation Source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + setcookie() = Session Fixation 
74: setcookie setcookie("pc_facility", $_SESSION['pc_facility'], time () + 
(3600 * 365));  
73: $_SESSION['pc_facility'] = $_GET['pc_facility'];  
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
requires: 





File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_FILES + fread() = File Disclosure 
87: fread $filetext = fread($tmpfile, $file['size']);  
86: $tmpfile = fopen($file['tmp_name'], "r");  
70: foreach($_FILES as $file) 
requires: 
57: if($request->ispost()) 






File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_FILES + fgetcsv() = File Disclosure 
170: fgetcsv $acsv = fgetcsv($fhcsv, 4096);  
147: $fhcsv = fopen($_FILES['userfile']['tmp_name'], "r");  
requires: 
136: if($form_step == 1) 
138: if(is_uploaded_file($_FILES['userfile']['tmp_name'])) 
149: if($fhcsv) 
153: if($form_vendor == '1235186800') 




File Disclosure - interface\patient_file/downl
oad_template.php 
File Disclosure - interface\patient_file/educat
ion.php 
File Disclosure - interface\patient_file/letter.
php 




File Disclosure - interface\patient_file/transa
ction/print_referral.php 
File Disclosure Source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET 
$_FILES + file() = File Disclosure 
60: file $Response271 = file($FilePath);  
41: $FilePath = $target;  
39: $target = $target . time () . basename($_FILES['uploaded']['name']);  
34: $target = $GLOBALS['edi_271_file_path'];  
177: $GLOBALS['edi_271_file_path'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . 
"/edi/";  // globals.php 
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
requires: 
36: if(isset($_FILES) && !empty($_FILES)) 
53: if(!isset($message)) 
55: if(move_uploaded_file($_FILES['uploaded']['tmp_name'], $target)) 
interface\reports/edi_271.ph
p 
File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_POST + opendir() = File Disclosure 
568: opendir $dh = opendir($themedir);  
567: $themedir = "$webserver_root/interface/themes";  
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
509: extract($_POST, EXTR_SKIP);  // globals.phpregister_globals 
implementationif($fake_register_globals), 
43: $_POST = undomagicquotes ($_POST);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
requires: 
397: if(!$userMode || in_array($grpname, $USER_SPECIFIC_TABS)) 
414: if(!$userMode || in_array($fldid, $USER_SPECIFIC_GLOBALS)) 






File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET 
$_POST + readfile() = File Disclosure 
55: readfile readfile($templatepath);  
42: $templatepath = "$templatedir/$form_filename";  
36: $templatedir = "$OE_SITE_DIR/documents/doctemplates";  
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
34: $form_filename = strip_escape_custom 
($_REQUEST['form_filename']);  







File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_POST 
$_FILES + fgets() = File Disclosure 
94: fgets $line = fgets($eres)) !==  
81: $eres = fopen($tmp_name, 'r');  // if($zipin->open($tmp_name) === 
true) else , 
60: $tmp_name = $_FILES['form_file']['tmp_name'];  
requires: 
57: if(!empty($_POST['bn_upload'])) 




File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_POST + file_get_contents() = File Disclosure 
56: file_get_contents $data = 
file_get_contents("https://rxnav.nlm.nih.gov/REST/interaction/list.json?rx
cuis=" . $rxcui_list);  
55: $rxcui_list = implode("+", $nameList);  
41: $nameList[] = $rXn['rxcui'];  
40: $rXn = sqlquery ("SELECT `rxcui` FROM `" . 
mitigatesqltableuppercase ('RXNCONSO') . "` WHERE `str` LIKE ?", 
array("%" . $drug[0] . "%"));  
39: $drug = explode(" ", $name['drug']);  
38: $name = sqlfetcharray ($medList)){ 
36: $medList = sqlstatement ("SELECT drug FROM prescriptions 
WHERE active = 1 AND patient_id = ?", array($pid));  
476: $pid = 0 : $_SESSION['pid'];  // globals.php 
474: $_SESSION['pid'] = $_POST['pid'];  // 
globals.phpelseif(!empty($_POST) && empty($_SESSION)), 







File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + file_get_contents() = File Disclosure 
76: file_get_contents $content = file_get_contents($temp_url);  
72: $temp_url = $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] . '/documents/' . 
$from_pathname . '/' . $from_filename;  
17: $GLOBALS['OE_SITE_DIR'] = $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] . 
'/' . $tmp;  // sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
15: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = dirname(__FILE__) . "/../sites";  
// sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
84: $GLOBALS['OE_SITES_BASE'] = "$webserver_root/sites";  // 
globals.php 
56: $webserver_root = str_replace("\\", "/", $webserver_root);  // 
globals.phpif(IS_WINDOWS), 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
53: $webserver_root = dirname(dirname(__FILE__));  // globals.php 
16: $tmp = 'default' : $_GET['site'];  // 
sqlconf.phpif(empty($GLOBALS)), 
42: $_GET = undomagicquotes ($_GET);  // 
globals.phpif($sanitize_all_escapes), 
71: $from_pathname = implode("/", $from_pathname_array);  
70: $from_pathname_array = array_reverse($from_pathname_array);  
68: $from_pathname_array[] = array_pop($from_all);  
64: $from_all = explode("/", $url);  
63: $url = preg_replace("|^(.*)://|", "", $url);  
42: $url = $d->get_url();  
65: $from_filename = array_pop($from_all);  
64: $from_all = explode("/", $url);  
63: $url = preg_replace("|^(.*)://|", "", $url);  
42: $url = $d->get_url();  
requires: 
39: if($_REQUEST['ccr_ajax'] == "yes") 
62: if($storagemethod == 1) else  






source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + fsockopen() = Protocol Injection 
236: fsockopen fsockopen(($this->ssl"ssl://" : "") . $ip, $port, $errno, 
$error, $this->timeout) :  
228: $ip = gethostbyname($domain), $domain)) // if(preg_match('/^[0-
9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}\.[0-9]{1,3}$/', $domain)) else , 






File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + file_get_contents() = File Disclosure 
1919: file_get_contents $ret = file_get_contents($path);  // 
tcpdf_static.php 
1918: foreach($alt as $path) // tcpdf_static.php 
1916: $alt = array_unique($alt);  // tcpdf_static.php 
1903: $alt[] = htmlspecialchars_decode(urldecode($tmp));  // 
tcpdf_static.phpif(preg_match('%^(https?)://%', $url) && 
empty($_SERVER) && empty($_SERVER)), if(empty($urldata)), 
if(strpos($url, $host) === 0), 
1902: $tmp = str_replace($host, $_SERVER['DOCUMENT_ROOT'], 
$url);  // tcpdf_static.phpif(preg_match('%^(https?)://%', $url) && 
empty($_SERVER) && empty($_SERVER)), if(empty($urldata)), 
if(strpos($url, $host) === 0), 
1899: $host = $protocol . '://' . $_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'];  // 
tcpdf_static.phpif(preg_match('%^(https?)://%', $url) && 
empty($_SERVER) && empty($_SERVER)), if(empty($urldata)), 
1883: $protocol .= 's';  // tcpdf_static.phpif(!empty($_SERVER) && 
(strtolower($_SERVER) != 'off')), 
1881: $protocol = 'http';  // tcpdf_static.php 
1881: $protocol = 'http';  // tcpdf_static.php 
1890: $url = htmlspecialchars_decode($url);  // tcpdf_static.php 
1888: $url = $protocol . ':' . str_replace(' ', '%20', $url);  // 
tcpdf_static.phpif(preg_match('%^//%', $url) && !empty($_SERVER)), 
1883: $protocol .= 's';  // tcpdf_static.phpif(!empty($_SERVER) && 
(strtolower($_SERVER) != 'off')), 
1881: $protocol = 'http';  // tcpdf_static.php 
1886: $url = $file;  // tcpdf_static.php 
1866: ⇓ function filegetcontents($file) 
requires: 





File Disclosure Source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + opendir() = File Disclosure 
138: fread $filetext = fread($tmpfile, $_FILES['file']['size'][$key]);  // 
C_Document.class.php 
137: $tmpfile = fopen($_FILES['file']['tmp_name'][$key], "r");  // 
C_Document.class.php 
requires: 
122: if(count($_FILES['file']['name']) > 0) 
136: if($_FILES['file']['error'][$key] > 0 || empty($fname) || 
$_FILES['file']['size'][$key] == 0) else  




File Disclosure Source  sink  vulnerability 
$_FILES + fread() = File Disclosure 
138: fread $filetext = fread($tmpfile, $_FILES['file']['size'][$key]);  // 
C_Document.class.php 
137: $tmpfile = fopen($_FILES['file']['tmp_name'][$key], "r");  // 
C_Document.class.php 
requires: 
122: if(count($_FILES['file']['name']) > 0) 
136: if($_FILES['file']['error'][$key] > 0 || empty($fname) || 
$_FILES['file']['size'][$key] == 0) else  






File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + readfile() = File Disclosure 
55: readfile readfile($script_name);  
49: $script_name .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $filename;  // 
if(preg_match("@^[\w][\w\.-]+$@", $filename)), 
42: $script_name = 'js';  
45: foreach($path as $index=>$filename) 
44: $path = explode("/", $script);  
40: foreach($_GET['scripts'] as $script) 
38: $_GET['scripts'] = json_decode($_GET['scripts']);  
22: $_GET['scripts'] = json_encode($_GET['scripts']);  
22: $_GET['scripts'] = json_encode($_GET['scripts']);  
requires: 
39: if(!empty($_GET['scripts']) && is_array($_GET['scripts'])) 





Session Fixation source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + session_id() = Session Fixation 








Session Fixation - phpmyadmin\libraries/plugi
ns/auth/AuthenticationSign
on.class.php 
File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + readfile() = File Disclosure 
55: readfile readfile($script_name);  
49: $script_name .= DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . $filename;  // 
if(preg_match("@^[\w][\w\.-]+$@", $filename)), 
42: $script_name = 'js';  
45: foreach($path as $index=>$filename) 
44: $path = explode("/", $script);  
40: foreach($_GET['scripts'] as $script) 
38: $_GET['scripts'] = json_decode($_GET['scripts']);  
22: $_GET['scripts'] = json_encode($_GET['scripts']);  
22: $_GET['scripts'] = json_encode($_GET['scripts']);  
requires: 
39: if(!empty($_GET['scripts']) && is_array($_GET['scripts'])) 







File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + file() = File Disclosure 
152: file $existing = file($output, FILE_IGNORE_NEW_LINES);  
93: $output = STDOUT;  // if(isset($opts->o)), if('-' == $output), 
91: $output = $opts->o;  // if(isset($opts->o)), 
89: $output = $path . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . 
'plugin_classmap.php';  
84: $path = realpath($libraryPath);  // if(isset($opts->l)), 
78: $libraryPath = rtrim($libraryPath, '/\\') . 
DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR;  // if(isset($opts->l)), 
77: $libraryPath = $opts->l;  // if(isset($opts->l)), 
77: $libraryPath = $opts->l;  // if(isset($opts->l)), 
73: $path = $_SERVER['PWD'];  // if(array_key_exists('PWD', 
$_SERVER)), 
71: $path = $libPath;  










Appendix B: PHP VulnHunter Results for OpenEMR 
 
Vulnerability Code Excerpt File 
XSS Line 318 
 
0309:       <td><?php echo 
htmlspecialchars(xl('Context'),ENT_QUOTES);?></td> 
0310:       <td> 
0311:       <select name='filter_context' id='filter_context' 
onchange='javascript:document.myform.submit();'> 
0312:       <option value=''><?php echo htmlspecialchars(xl('Select a 
Context'),ENT_QUOTES);?></option> 
0313:       <?php 
0314:       $context_sql="SELECT * FROM customlists WHERE 
cl_list_type=2 AND cl_deleted=0"; 
0315:       $context_res=sqlStatement($context_sql); 
0316:     while($context_row=sqlFetchArray($context_res)){ 
0317:       echo "<option 
value='".htmlspecialchars($context_row['cl_list_slno'],ENT_QUOTES)."' "; 
0318:       echo  ($_REQUEST['filter_context']==$context_row['cl_list_slno']) 
? 'selected' : '' ; 
0319:       echo 
">".htmlspecialchars($context_row['cl_list_item_long'],ENT_QUOTES)."</op
tion>"; 
0320:       } 
0321:       ?> 
0322:       </select> 
0323:      </td> 
0324:      <td><?php echo 
htmlspecialchars(xl('Users'),ENT_QUOTES);?></td> 
0325:      <td> 
0326:      <select name='filter_users' id='filter_users' 
onchange='javascript:document.myform.submit();'> 






XSS Line 333 
 
0324:       <td><?php echo 
htmlspecialchars(xl('Users'),ENT_QUOTES);?></td> 
0325:        <td> 
0326:        <select name='filter_users' id='filter_users' 
onchange='javascript:document.myform.submit();'> 
0327:        <option value=''><?php echo htmlspecialchars(xl('Select a 
User'),ENT_QUOTES);?></option> 
0328:        <?php 
0329:        $user_sql="SELECT DISTINCT(tu.tu_user_id),u.fname,u.lname 
FROM template_users AS tu LEFT OUTER JOIN users AS u ON 
tu.tu_user_id=u.id WHERE tu.tu_user_id!=?"; 
0330:       $user_res=sqlStatement($user_sql,array($_SESSION['authId'])); 
0331:       while($user_row=sqlFetchArray($user_res)){ 
0332:       echo "<option 
value='".htmlspecialchars($user_row['tu_user_id'],ENT_QUOTES)."' "; 
0333:       echo  ($_REQUEST['filter_users']==$user_row['tu_user_id']) ? 
'selected' : '' ; 
0334:       echo ">".htmlspecialchars($user_row['fname']." 
".$user_row['lname'],ENT_QUOTES)."</option>"; 
0335:       } 
0336:        ?> 
0337:      </select> 
0338:      </td> 
0339:      </tr> 
0340:      </table> 
0341:      </fieldset> 
0342:      <table align="center" width="100%"> 
library\custom_template\pe
rsonalize.php 
XSS Line 155 
 
0146:  
0147: <!-- Required for the popup date selectors --> 
0148: <div id="overDiv" style="position:absolute; visibility:hidden; z-
index:1000;"></div> 
0149:  
0150: <form id="new-encounter-form" method='post' action="<?php echo 
$rootdir ?>/forms/newpatient/save.php" name='new_encounter'> 
0151:  
0152: <div style='float:left'> 
0153: <?php if ($viewmode) { ?> 
0154: <input type=hidden name='mode' value='update'> 
0155: <input type=hidden name='id' value='<?php echo (isset($_GET["id"])) ? 
attr($_GET["id"]) : '' ?>'> 
0156: <span class=title><?php echo xlt('Patient Encounter Form'); ?></span> 
0157: <?php } else { ?> 
0158: <input type='hidden' name='mode' value='new'> 
0159: <span class='title'><?php echo xlt('New Encounter Form'); ?></span> 














0210:   
0211: if (php_sapi_name() == 'cli') { 
0212:  parse_str(implode('&', array_slice($argv, 1)), $_GET); 
0213:  $_SERVER['REQUEST_URI']=$_SERVER['PHP_SELF']; 
0214:  $_SERVER['SERVER_NAME']='localhost'; 
0215:  $backpic = ""; 
0216:  $ignoreAuth=1; 
0217: } 
0218: $get_count = extract( $_GET, EXTR_OVERWRITE); 
0219: // Following breaks link to OpenEMR structure dependency - assumes 
phpseclib is subdir 
0220: $script_dir = dirname(__FILE__); 
0221: ini_set('include_path', ini_get('include_path') . PATH_SEPARATOR . 
"$script_dir/phpseclib"); 
0222: require_once ("$script_dir/phpseclib/Net/SFTP.php"); 
0223: function get_openemr_globals ($libdir) { 
0224:  if (!isset($site)) $_GET['site'] = 'default'; 
0225:  require_once ("$libdir/../interface/globals.php"); 
0226: } 









0003: $special_timeout = 3600; 
0004: require_once("../../../interface/globals.php"); 
0005: // if (!allowed("frmprint")){ msgDenied(); } 
0006:  
0007: // ensure the path variable has no illegal characters 
0008: check_file_dir_name($_GET["formname"]); 
0009:  










0017:   $encounter = $_GET['encounter']; 
0018:   } 
0019:          if($_GET["formname"] != "newpatient" ){ 
0020:             include_once("$incdir/patient_file/encounter/new_form.php"); 
0021:          } 
0022:  
0023:   // ensure the path variable has no illegal characters 
0024:   check_file_dir_name($_GET["formname"]); 
0025:  












0009: if (substr($_GET["formname"], 0, 3) === 'LBF') { 
0010:   // Use the List Based Forms engine for all LBFxxxxx forms. 
0011:   include_once("$incdir/forms/LBF/view.php"); 
0012: } 
0013: else { 
0014:  
0015:   // ensure the path variable has no illegal characters 
0016:   check_file_dir_name($_GET["formname"]); 
0017:  
0018:   include_once("$incdir/forms/" . $_GET["formname"] . "/view.php"); 
0019: } 
0020:  








Appendix C: RIPS Results for OpenClinic 
 
Vulnerability Vulnerability Concept File(s) 
File Disclosure source  sink  vulnerability 
$_POST 







File Manipulation source  sink  vulnerability 
$_GET + chmod() = File Manipulation 
chmod chmod($destinationFile, 0644); 
124: $destinationFile = $destinationDir . '/' . $destinationName; 
114: ⇓ function upload(&$file, $destinationDir = "", $destinationName = "", 
$secure = true) 
122: $destinationName = $file['name']; 
114: ⇓ function upload(&$file, $destinationDir = "", $destinationName = "", 




Cross-Site Scripting source  sink  vulnerability 










source  sink  vulnerability 







Appendix D: PHP VulnHunter Results for OpenClinic  
 
Vulnerability Code Excerpt File 
SQL injection Line 600, 602, 604 
 
0591:       ); 
0592:       echo HTML::itemList($array); 
0593:  
0594:       exit(); 
0595:     } 
0596:  
0597:     /** 
0598:      * Database creation 
0599:      */ 
0600:     mysql_query('DROP DATABASE IF EXISTS ' . 
$_POST['dbName']) or die(sprintf(_("Instruction: %s Error: %s"), 
$sql, mysql_error())); 
0601:     //mysql_create_db($_POST['dbName']); 
0602:     mysql_query('CREATE DATABASE ' . 
$_POST['dbName']) or die(sprintf(_("Instruction: %s Error: %s"), 
$sql, mysql_error())); 
0603:     //mysql_select_db($_POST['dbName']); 
0604:     mysql_query('USE ' . $_POST['dbName']) or 
die(sprintf(_("Instruction: %s Error: %s"), $sql, mysql_error())); 
0605:  
0606:     /** 
0607:      * Database tables creation 
0608:      */ 
0609:     require_once(dirname(__FILE__) . 
"/parse_sql_file.php"); 
0610:  
0611:     $tables = getTables(); 
0612:     foreach ($tables as $tableName) 





SQL injection Line 634 
 
0625:         exit(); 
0626:       } 
0627:     } 
0628:  
0629:     /** 
0630:      * Database tables update (setting_tbl, staff_tbl, 
user_tbl) 
0631:      */ 
0632:     //mysql_select_db($_POST['dbName']); 
0633:     mysql_connect($_POST['dbHost'], 
$_POST['dbUser'], $_POST['dbPasswd']) or 
die(sprintf(_("Instruction: %s Error: %s"), $sql, 
mysql_error())); 
0634:     mysql_query('USE ' . $_POST['dbName']) or 
die(sprintf(_("Instruction: %s Error: %s"), $sql, 
mysql_error())); 
0635:  
0636:     $sql = "UPDATE setting_tbl SET "; 
0637:     $sql .= "clinic_name='" . $_POST['clinicName'] . 
"', "; 
0638:     $sql .= "clinic_hours='" . $_POST['clinicHours'] . 
"', "; 
0639:     $sql .= "clinic_address='" . 
$_POST['clinicAddress'] . "', "; 
0640:     $sql .= "clinic_phone='" . $_POST['clinicPhone'] . 
"', "; 
0641:     $sql .= "language='" . $_POST['clinicLanguage'] . 
"', "; 
0642:     $sql .= "session_timeout=" . 
intval($_POST['timeout']) . ", "; 
0643:     $sql .= "items_per_page=" . 





XSS Line 363 
 
0354:   if ( !$single ) // == false 
0355:   { 
0356:     $auxConn->close(); 
0357:     unset($auxConn); 
0358:   } 
0359:  
0360:   /** 
0361:    * "Displays" the dump... 
0362:    */ 
0363:   echo (isset($_POST['as_file']) ? $dumpBuffer : 
HTML::xmlEntities($dumpBuffer)); 
0364:  
0365:   /** 
0366:    * Close the html tags and add the footers in dump 
is displayed on screen 
0367:    */ 
0368:   if (empty($_POST['as_file'])) 
0369:   { 
0370:     echo HTML::end('pre'); 








Appendix E: HIPAA Security Checklist  
Security Rule 
Reference SAFEGUARD STATUS 
Administrative Safeguards 
164.308(a)(1)(i) Security Management Process: Implement policies and 
procedures to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security 
violations. 
 
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(A) Have a Risk Analysis completed based on NIST Guidelines. REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(B) Complete Risk Management process based on NIST Guidelines. REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(C) Have formal sanctions or policies against employees who fail to 
comply with security policies and procedures. 
REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(1)(ii)(D) Implement procedures to regularly review records of activities 
such as audit logs, access reports, and security incident tracking. 
REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(2) Assigned Security Responsibility: Identify the security official 
who is responsible for the development and implementation of 
the policies and procedures required by this subpart for the entity. 
REQUIRED  
164.308(a)(3)(i) Workforce Security: Implement policies and procedures to ensure 
that all members of its workforce have appropriate access to 
EPHI, as provided under paragraph (a)(4) of this section, and to 
prevent those workforce members who do not have access under 
paragraph (a)(4) of this section from obtaining access to 
electronic protected health information (EPHI). 
 
164.308(a)(3)(ii)(A) Implement procedures for the authorization and/or supervision of 
employees who work with EPHI or in locations where it might be 
accessed. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(3)(ii)(B) Implement procedures to determine that access of employees to 
EPHI is appropriate. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(3)(ii)(C) Implement procedures for terminating access to EPHI when an 
employee leaves you organization or as required by paragraph 
(a)(3)(ii)(B) of this section. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(4)(i) Information Access Management: Implement policies and 
procedures for authorizing access to EPHI that are consistent 
with the applicable requirements of subpart E of this part. 
 
164.308(a)(4)(ii)(A) For clearinghouses, implemented policies and procedures to 
protect EPHI from the larger organization. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(4)(ii)(B) Implement policies and procedures for granting access to EPHI, 
for example, through access to a workstation, transaction, 
program, or process. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(4)(ii)(C) Implement policies and procedures that are based upon your 
access authorization policies, established, document, review, and 
modify a user’s right of access to a workstation, transaction, 
program, or process. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(5)(i) Security Awareness and Training: Implement a security 
awareness and training program for all members of its workforce 
(including management). 
 
164.308(a)(5)(ii)(A) Provide periodic information security reminders. ADDRESSABLE 
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164.308(a)(5)(ii)(B) Develop policies and procedures for guarding against, detecting, 
and reporting malicious software. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(5)(ii)(C) Develop procedures for monitoring login attempts and reporting 
discrepancies. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(5)(ii)(D) Develop procedures for creating, changing, and safeguarding 
passwords. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(6)(i) Security Incident Procedures: Implement policies and procedures 
to address security incidents. 
 
164.308(a)(6)(ii) Develop procedures to identify and respond to suspected or know 
security incidents; mitigate to the extent practicable, harmful 
effects of known security incidents; and document incidents and 
their outcomes. 
REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(7)(i) Contingency Plan: Establish (and implement as needed) policies 
and procedures for responding to an emergency or other 
occurrence (for example, fire, vandalism, system failure, and 
natural disaster) that damages systems that contain EPHI. 
 
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(A) Establish and implement procedures to create and maintain 
retrievable exact copies of EPHI. 
REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(B) Establish (and implement as needed) procedures to restore any 
loss of EPHI data that is stored electronically. 
REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(C) Establish (and implement as needed) procedures to enable 
continuation of critical business processes and for protection of 
EPHI while operating in the emergency mode. 
REQUIRED 
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(D) Implement procedures for periodic testing and revision of 
contingency plans. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(7)(ii)(E) Assess the relative criticality of specific applications and data in 
support of other contingency plan components. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.308(a)(8) Establish a plan for periodic technical and nontechnical 
evaluation, based initially upon the standards implemented under 
this rule and subsequently, in response to environmental or 
operational changes affecting the security of EPHI that 
establishes the extent to which an entity’s security policies and 
procedures meet the requirements of this subpart. 
REQUIRED 
164.308(b)(1) Business Associate Contracts and Other Arrangements: A 
covered entity, in accordance with Sec. 164.306, may permit a 
business associate to create, receive, maintain, or transmit EPHI 
on the covered entity’s behalf only of the covered entity obtains 
satisfactory assurances, in accordance with Sec. 164.314(a) that 
the business associate appropriately safeguard the information. 
 
164.308(b)(4) Establish written contracts or other arrangements with your 
trading partners that documents satisfactory assurances required 
by paragraph (b)(1) of this section that meets the applicable 
requirements of Sec. 164.314(a). 
REQUIRED 
Physical Safeguards 
164.310(a)(1) Facility Access Controls: Implement policies and procedures to 
limit physical access to its electronic information systems and the 
facility or facilities in which they are housed, while ensuring that 




164.310(a)(2)(i) Establish (and implement as needed) procedures that allow 
facility access in support of restoration of lost data under the 
disaster recovery plan and emergency mode operations plan in 
the event of an emergency. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.310(a)(2)(ii) Implement policies and procedures to safeguard the facility and 
the equipment therein from unauthorized physical access, 
tampering, and theft. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.310(a)(2)(iii) Implement procedures to control and validate a person’s access to 
facilities based on their role or function, including visitor control, 
and control of access to software programs for testing and 
revision. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.310(a)(2)(iv) Implement policies and procedures to document repairs and 
modifications to the physical components of a facility, which are 
related to security (for example, hardware, walls, doors, and 
locks). 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.310(b) Implement policies and procedures that specify the proper 
functions to be performed, the manner in which those functions 
are to be performed, and the physical attributes of the 
surroundings of a specific workstation or class of workstation 
that can access EPHI. 
REQUIRED 
164.310(c) Implement physical safeguards for all workstations that access 
EPHI to restrict access to authorized users. 
REQUIRED 
164.310(d)(1) Device and Media Controls: Implement policies and procedures 
that govern the receipt and removal of hardware and electronic 
media that contain EPHI into and out of a facility, and the 
movement of these items within the facility. 
 
164.310(d)(2)(i) Implement policies and procedures to address final disposition of 
EPHI, and/or hardware or electronic media on which it is stored. 
REQUIRED 
164.310(d)(2)(ii) Implement procedures for removal of EPHI from electronic 
media before the media are available for reuse. 
REQUIRED 
164.310(d)(2)(iii) Maintain a record of the movements of hardware and electronic 
media and the person responsible for its movement. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.310(d)(2)(iv) Create a retrievable, exact copy of EPHI, when needed, before 
movement of equipment. 
ADDRESSABLE 
Technical Safeguard 
164.312(a)(1) Access Controls: Implement technical policies and procedures for 
electronic information systems that maintain EPHI to allow 
access only to those persons or software programs that have been 
granted access rights as specified in Sec. 164.308(a)(4). 
 
164.312(a)(2)(i) Assign a unique name and/or number for identifying and tracking 
user identity. 
REQUIRED 
164.312(a)(2)(ii) Establish (and implement as needed) procedures for obtaining 
necessary EPHI during and emergency. 
REQUIRED 
164.312(a)(2)(iii) Implement procedures that terminate an electronic session after a 
predetermined time of inactivity. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.312(a)(2)(iv) Implement a mechanism to encrypt and decrypt EPHI. ADDRESSABLE 
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164.312(b) Implement Audit Controls, hardware, software, and/or procedural 
mechanisms that record and examine activity in information 
systems that contain or use EPHI. 
REQUIRED 
164.312(c)(1) Integrity: Implement policies and procedures to protect EPHI 
from improper alteration or destruction. 
 
164.312(c)(2) Implement electronic mechanisms to corroborate that EPHI has 
not been altered or destroyed in an unauthorized manner. 
ADDRESSABLE 
164.312(d) Implement Person or Entity Authentication procedures to verify 
that a person or entity seeking access EPHI is the one claimed. 
REQUIRED 
164.312(e)(1) Transmission Security: Implement technical security measures to 
guard against unauthorized access to EPHI that is being 
transmitted over an electronic communications network. 
 
164.312(e)(2)(i) Implement security measures to ensure that electronically 
transmitted EPHI is not improperly modified without detection 
until disposed of. 
ADDRESSABLE 
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